Collective Dominance and Collusion Parallelism in EU and US Competition Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Marilena Filippelli, Free University of Bozen has written on Collective Dominance and Collusion Parallelism in EU and US Competition Law

BOOK ABSTRACT: The book contains a suggested approach to collusion, in ex ante and ex post perspectives. By moving from the analysis of the state of art, in terms of law, case law, and scholarship, Marilena Filippelli analyses inconsistencies and failures in the current antitrust enforcement toward collusion and develops a workable parameter for the issue of collective dominance. The most innovative part of this work goes beyond the analysis of collective dominance itself and involves the interference of arts. 101 and 102. The conclusion is a re-definition of the relationship between those rules—from dichotomy to redundancy. Finally, the book highlights the antitrust significance of semi-collusion as a strategy made of collusion and competition. The author considers economic models equalling, as for the effects, collusion and semi-collusion and the case law supporting the qualification of semi-collusion as a species of collusion. The analysis involves both US and EU systems under the highly topical economic-oriented approach. It also contains an original view of European antitrust prohibitions.