Pieter Kalbfleisch, Nov 05, 2010
Would it lead to more effective sanctioning of cartel violations if attention were shifted from sanctioning undertakings to primarily sanctioning those individuals who, de facto, either exercised leadership over or gave instructions to a cartel violation, along with those who refrained from taking any measures to stop the violation, even though they had the power to stop the violation or to prevent it from happening? This article will examine why the answer to this question is both yes and no.
Featured News
EU Closes Antitrust Case Against Edwards Lifesciences After Policy Withdrawal
Feb 16, 2026 by
CPI
Federal Judge Rules AI Chatbot Conversations Can Be Seized as Evidence in Fraud Cases
Feb 16, 2026 by
CPI
Michigan Alleges Oil Industry Conspired to Stall EVs and Renewable Power
Feb 16, 2026 by
CPI
Jones Day Expands German Antitrust Practice with Senior Munich Hire
Feb 16, 2026 by
CPI
UK Considers Australian-Style Social Media Ban for Under-16s; Moves to Tighten AI Safety Laws
Feb 16, 2026 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Antitrust Chronicle® – Hub-&-Spoke Conspiracies
Jan 26, 2026 by
CPI
A Data Analytics Company as the Hub in a Hub-and-Spoke Cartel
Jan 26, 2026 by
Joseph Harrington
Hub and Spoke Cartels
Jan 26, 2026 by
Patrick Van Cayseele
Hub-and-Spoke Collusion or Vertical Exclusion? Identifying the Rim in Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracies
Jan 26, 2026 by
Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Pedro Gonzaga, Laura Ildefonso & Albert Metz
The Algorithmic Middleman in a Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracy: Divergent Court Decisions and the Expanding Patchwork of State and Local Regulations
Jan 26, 2026 by
Bradley C. Weber