CPI 1(2)

By CPI | December 19, 2015

Judicial Review of Antitrust Cases

Bo Vesterdorf, Sep 01, 2005

Judicial Review in EC Competition Law: Reflections on the Role of the Community Courts in the EC System of Competition Law Enforcement

This paper sets out personal reflections on the role of the judiciary within a primarily administrative system of enforcement of the competition laws.

Valentine Korah, Sep 01, 2005

Judicial Review in EC and U.S. Antitrust Law

The first two articles of this issue are based on presentations for the inaugural edition of the University College London Antitrust Forum held on March 3, 2005.

Leah Brannon, Douglas Ginsburg, Sep 01, 2005

Determinants of Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States

This paper offers a historical overview of private antitrust enforcement in the United States and an explanation of why private case filings have increased and decreased over the years.

From the Editor

Richard Schmalensee, Sep 01, 2005

From the Editor: Autumn 2005

The second issue of Competition Policy International begins with articles by two distinguished jurists representing both sides of the Atlantic.

A Colloquy on Vertical Restrictions

James Cooper, Luke Froeb, Daniel O’Brien, Michael Vita, Sep 01, 2005

Vertical Restrictions and Antitrust Policy: What About the Evidence?

Until theory can be used to determine how likely it is that a restraint will lead to an anticompetitive outcome, decision makers will be left with a considerable amount of uncertainty.

F.M. Scherer, Sep 01, 2005

Comment on Cooper et al.’s “Vertical Restrictions and Antitrust Policy”

This paper provides a critical analysis of the paper on vertical restraints and competition policy by James Cooper et al.

Ralph Winter, Sep 01, 2005

Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy: A Reaction to Cooper, Froeb, O’Brien, and Vita

Cooper, Froeb, OBrien, and Vita argue that (1) economic theory, especially post-Chicago theory, provides little in the way of unambiguous predictions of when vertical restraints are pro-competitive versus anticompetitive, forcing antitrust decisions to rely mainly on prior empirical evidence rather than case-specific facts; and (2) prior evidence indicates that vertical restraints are unlikely to harm consumers. Antitrust policy, therefore, should be lenient towards the restraints.

A Symposium on Loyalty Rebates

David Spector, Sep 01, 2005

Loyalty Rebates: An Assessment of Competition Concerns and a Proposed Structured Rule of Reason

This paper reviews the pro-competitive and anticompetitive motives for loyalty rebates. This paper concludes by proposing a structured rule of reason for the antitrust handling of loyalty rebates cases.

Bruce Kobayashi, Sep 01, 2006

The Economics of Loyalty Rebates and Antitrust Law in the United States

The courts treatment of loyalty discounts under U.S. antitrust laws is broadly consistent with an approach that recognizes the high costs of erroneously condemning behavior that would lower prices and increase welfare, and the speculative nature of the anticompetitive harm that might result.

Alberto Heimler, Sep 01, 2005

Below-Cost Pricing and Loyalty-Inducing Discounts: Are They Restrictive and If So, When?

Abuse of dominance is the area where the divergence between U.S. and EC antitrust enforcement practices is still very significant. In particular, in the European Community, the identification of price abuses is mostly based on the abstract ability to exclude, while in the United States, the emphasis is mainly on visible and tangible effects.

The Classics

Keith Hylton, Sep 01, 2005