By María Fernanda Viecens[1]
When considering Argentina’s competition laws, a peculiar situation stands out. Argentina does have a merger control regime, but it lacks a pre-merger notification system. Historically this has led to challenges in enforcing the law, but the current situation is arguably the worst the country has ever faced. The weaknesses of the system have become starkly evident — exacerbated by the competition authority’s institutional weakness. In particular, the CNDC (National Commission for the Defense of Competition) is the competition agency with the lowest level of independence in the entire region. Specifically, its opinion is non-binding, and the final decision lies with the Secretary of Commerce.While the world is discussing new challenges for merger control arising from the digital economy or improvements to established systems (Motta & Peitz, 2021; Kwoka & Valletti, 2021,2024; OECD, 2023)[2], Argentina is still dealing with the consequences of a weak competition enforcement system — one of the major unresolved issues of Argentine democracy — and a merger control framework with serious shortcomings.
Telefónica de España is leaving the region; it is selling practically all its holdings in Latin American countries, Argentina is no exception and on February 2025 Telecom acquired exclusive control over Telefónica for an amount of USD 1.245 billion.[3] The key point is that Telefónica has announced that it has already exited the country, that the shares have already been transferred back to Spain, and that the operation is irreversible. It is the first time something like this has happened, and the situation was only possible due to the absence of a pre-merger notification system. By the time the buyer has notified the transaction, the seller — Telefónica de España — has already left the country.
I will not discuss here the anticompetitive effects of the merger. However, the issue at hand is what the transaction means for the Argentine mobile communications market shrinking from three players to just two, with the merged company holding 66 percent of the market. There is also a significant overlap in fixed network infrastructure. The buyer, Telecom is an incumbent company that had already merged with the main pay TV operator, Cablevisión (it was a convergent merger) only a few years ago.[4] This is clearly a transaction that merits detailed scrutiny; nevertheless, the idea that the operation is “irreversible” has been established in the media. [5]
All of this has taken place within the last two months, and the Competition Authority, for the first time, has issued an interim measure imposing the notification obligation to hold upon both parties separately.[6] The measure includes any initiative aimed at unifying or integrating the teams that are part of Telefónica and Telecom, any exchange of competitively sensitive information such as prices and pricing strategies, costs and margins, business plans and commercial strategies, information about clients and suppliers, investment plans, among others.
The absence of a pre-merger notification regime has historically generated significant challenges, including prolonged delays in the review process, as the incentives of the involved parties are not aligned accordingly. That is, the system does not impose the same urgency for resolution as a pre-merger framework would. In cross-border transactions, Argentina has consistently lagged behind the rest of the world in terms of timing, as cases are typically resolved later, limiting its capacity for cooperation with other competition authorities. Nonetheless, the current case—an operation of considerable magnitude—has given rise to an unprecedented scenario, posing substantial risks for the effective enforcement of merger remedies to avoid anticompetitive effects that may arise from the transaction.
The fragility of Argentina’s regulatory system has become evident, and the implementation of ex ante control with pre-merger notification is urgent. This can only happen once the new authority established by the 2018 law is finally implemented. The selection process for its formation was recently announced,[7] and from that point onward, the law provides for an additional one-year transition period before pre-notification becomes mandatory. It is imperative that Argentina does not miss this opportunity and moves forward with the implementation of an independent authority capable of ensuring effective merger control, including pre-notification.
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[1] PhD in Economics and former Commissioner of the Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia (CNDC) in Argentina. She is a researcher of CETyS (Center Technology and Society) at Universidad de San Andrés and has published in journals such as the Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Development Policy Review, Information Economics and Policy, Review of Network Economics, Telecommunications Policy, among others. She has been a researcher at the Foundation for Studies in Applied Economics (FEDEA, Madrid) and consultant for international organizations. She teaches postgraduate courses on Competition Policy, Digital Markets and Fintech at Universidad de San Andrés and Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
[2] Motta, M. and Peitz, M. (2021), Big Tech Mergers, Information Economics and Policy, 54; Kwoka, J. and Valletti, T (2021), Unscrambling the eggs: breaking up consummated mergers and dominant firms, Industrial and Corporate Change, 2021, 30, 1286–1306; Kwoka, J. and Valletti, T (2025), Confronting Consummated Mergers, An Inquiry into Policy and Practice, mimeo. OECD (2023), Theories of Harm for Digital Mergers, OECD Competition Policy Roundtable Background Note
[3] See the Registro de operaciones de concentración económica notificadas (Registry of Notified Economic Concentration Transactions). Available at: https://www.argentina.gob.ar/defensadelacompetencia/registro-nacional/registro-de-operaciones-de-concentracion-economica-notificadas.
[4] CABLEVISIÓN S.A., CABLEVISIÓN HOLDING S.A., TELECOM ARGENTINA S.A., FINTECH MEDIA LLC Y FINTECH TELECOM LLC” S/ NOTIFICACIÓN ART.8 LEY 25.156, https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/conc1507.pdf.
[5] “El Grupo Clarín compró Telefónica: “La operación es irreversible. El dinero ya está cobrado y las acciones transferidas” (The Clarín Group bought Telefónica: “The operation is irreversible. The money has already been received and the shares transferred”, author’s translation), https://eleconomista.com.ar/negocios/el-grupo-clarin-compro-telefonica-la-operacion-irreversible-dinero-ya-esta-cobrado-acciones-transferidas-n82568 ; “En el mercado de las telecomunicaciones, los principales actores reconocen que la venta de la filial local de Telefónica realizada en Madrid es irreversible y la gente de Telecom, o el grupo Clarin, actúa con el poder de “los hechos consumados” (In the telecommunications market, the main players acknowledge that the sale of Telefónica’s local subsidiary, carried out in Madrid, is irreversible, and the people from Telecom or the Clarín Group act with the power of a “fait accompli.” author’s translation) https://www.iprofesional.com/economia/425660-telefonica-claro-telecentro-aun-pelean-contra-grupo-clarin.
[6] https://cablevisionholding.com/files/Comunicados-Prensa/2025/CVH.%20Hecho%20relevante%20Resoluci%C3%B3n%20de%20la%20Secretar%C3%ADa%20de%20Industria%20y%20Comercio.pdf.
[7] https://www.argentina.gob.ar/desregulacion/transformacion-del-estado-y-funcion-publica/concursar/convocatoria-abierta-7-cargos-de
