Richard Gilbert, Nov 01, 2008
The Evans and Hylton paper on The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly Power and its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust arrived in my in-box at about the same time as the U.S. Department of Justice´s report on Competition And Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 Of The Sherman Act (DOJ Report). The two documents have much in common. Both place the historical development of the legal treatment of monopoly in an historical context and consider appropriate tests to evaluate when single-firm conduct should run afoul of the Sherman Act. The DOJ Report generated considerable controversy. The Federal Trade Commission co-organized hearings on Section 2 enforcement with the Department of Justice, but did not endorse the final report. Among other criticisms, Commissioners Harbour, Leibowitz, and Rosch faulted the DOJ Report for relying too heavily on economic theory in the consideration of applying antitrust law.
Evans and Hylton would appear to agree with this critique if economic theory is interpreted to be a static analysis of competitive effects. The authors fault economists for a . . . focus on issues that pertain to static competition, not because they are more important than dynamic competition, but because that is what they are able to work out mathematically. This leads to a tractability bias that emphasizes static competition concerns at the expense of potentially more important dynamic effects. I am sympathetic with the concern that dynamic considerations are often neglected in competition analysis. Dynamic competitive effects, while complex to analyze, are too important to ignore and I have emphasized dynamic competition in my own evaluations of the state of competition policy. Dynamic considerations influence competition policy in two general ways. The first is the role of dynamic competition in identifying the types of conduct that should raise antitrust concerns under the antitrust laws. The second is the role of dynamic competition in evaluating the effects of conduct that is challenged under the antitrust laws.
Links to Full Content
Featured News
Congress Pushes to Combat AI Deepfakes in Year-End Funding Deal
Dec 18, 2024 by
CPI
Epic Games Board Resignations Linked to DOJ Antitrust Investigation
Dec 18, 2024 by
CPI
Renault Supports Potential Honda-Nissan Merger Talks
Dec 18, 2024 by
CPI
South Korea’s Antitrust Body Raises Concerns Over AI Market Competition
Dec 18, 2024 by
CPI
Perplexity Caught in Crossfire as DOJ and Google Battle Over Search Dominance
Dec 18, 2024 by
CPI
Antitrust Mix by CPI
Remedies After Illumina/GRAIL– The Thorny Question of Proportionality
Dec 17, 2024 by
Aleksander Tombinski & Ciara Denihan
Why Was Illumina/GRAIL Blocked in the EU? Reviewing The European Commission’s Assessment of Vertical Mergers in Light of the 2022 Prohibition Decision
Dec 17, 2024 by
Will Sparks
The Role of Uncertainty in the Future European Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Lessons Learned From Illumina/GRAIL
Dec 17, 2024 by
Svend Albaek & Daniel Donath
Illumina’s Light on Article 22 EUMR: The Suspended Step and Uncertain Future of EU Merger Control Over Below-Threshold “Killer” Mergers
Dec 17, 2024 by
Anna Tzanaki
EU-Level Jurisdiction Over “Killer Acquisitions” in the Aftermath of Illumina/GRAIL
Dec 17, 2024 by
Peter Whelan