Many companies avail themselves of the Antitrust Division’s “leniency plus” policy. Leniency plus allows companies pleading guilty to price- xing of one product to receive a signi cantly reduced ne if, at the same time, they obtain leniency for reporting illegal conduct related to one or more additional prod- ucts. The bene ts are signi cant, but companies taking advantage of leniency plus also face risks. First, the burdens of cooperation can be immense, and companies must be prepared to pay signi cant time and expense. Second, companies must do what they can to avoid “penalty plus.” Finally, the reality that employees often will obtain leniency for price- xing of some products but face prosecution for others greatly complicates the company’s efforts. This article explores those risks.
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